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THE JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF EQUITY TO
ADMINISTER INSOLVENTS' ESTATES, CON-
SIDERED IN RELATION TO HISTORICAL
ANTECEDENTS.*
IV.
Thus far our discussion has carried us into the history of
two types of creditors' bills, the first to reach assets in the
hands of a debtor's executor, and the second to reach a
debtor's equitable assets during his lifetime. A third type
of creditors' bills, designed to reach property fraudulently
conveyed by a living debtor to a third person, has been men-
tioned but not discussed. This has been because the latter
class does not seem to have consequences to the administrative
jurisdiction of equity, and does not therefore seem germane
to the principal purpose of this paper to uncover the histor-
ical antecedents of that jurisdiction.
The essential elements of the subject of fraudulent con-
veyances may be obtained from Mr. Glenn's book on Cred-
itors' Rights.5 It may be advisable, however, to make two
observations which will serve to throw creditors' bills to set
aside fraudulent conveyances, into correlation with other
equitable creditors' remedies. The first observation to be
made is that the right of a creditor to have satisfaction from
property fraudulently conveyed by a debtor, is not a right
which equity in the development of its creditors' bills created.
This was the work of the Statute of 13 Elizabeth, Chapter 5,
commonly known as the Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances,
which declares all conveyances of certain types of property
made with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors,
*By Harry W. Kroeger of the St. Louis Bar.
Note:-The first installment of this article was published in Number 2,
February, 1924. This is the concluding installment.-Ed.
85. Glenn. Creditors' Rights, pp. 49-137.
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void; with a proviso saving the rights of bona fide purchas-
ers for a valuable consideration. The true function of the cred-
itors' bill to set aside fraudulent conveyances, was to render
more complete the common law remedies under the statute.
The statute, declaring the conveyance void, would justify a
common law execution as if the property instead of being
conveyed were still the debtor's. This, however, was an inad-
equate remedy inasmuch as the amount which the creditor
could derive from the sale of the property under execution
depended upon how clear a title the sheriff's deed would
convey. The common law process involved no adjudication
of this matter. Equity was able, however, to furnish an
adequate remedy by allowing a bill to set aside the convey-
ance to be filed, and the right of realization from the land
alleged to have been fraudulently conveyed to be determined.
The second observation to be made is on the question of
the fraudulent conveyance of equitable assets, the fraudulent
conveyance of which was not governed by the Statute of 13
Elizabeth. The relief asked in a creditor's bill to set aside
a conveyance of equitable assets, would have required two
processes, the nullification of the conveyance to the third
person, and the equitable execution against the property as
equitable property of the debtor's. The latter right had been
definitely established. It was the former, the nullification of
the conveyance of the equitable property, which caused the
difficulty, since equitable property was not mentioned by the
Statute of Elizabeth. The English Court of Chancery in
Dundas v. Dutenss6 the same case in which Lord Thurlow
repudiated the doctrine of equitable execution against equit-
able interests in choses in action, declined to allow a bill to
set aside a fraudulent conveyance of equitable property.
Lord Thurlow evidently saw no justification in granting the
relief which the statute directs, except in connection with
conveyances of the kinds of property specified. There was
86. 1 Ves. Jr. 196.
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a strong tendency in the United States8 7 to follow the earlier
English cases of Taylor v. Jones,88 assuming the jurisdiction.
Perhaps the dominant motif of the early course of equit-
able growth in the matter of creditors' remedies, was the
inadequacy of legal execution in the various instances in
which equity acted, and the various junctures where its reme-
dies appeared. Its chief concern was not the supplanting of
the common law system of judgment and execution, a system
far more simple than, and equally effective in most cases with,
the Roman Law method of execution; but it was the patching
up of the common law system. The various remedies, appear-
ing in the course of this patching up process, creditors' bills,
will be seen to involve this defect, that if the debtor turn
out to be insolvent, a race of creditors will ensue, and prior-
ities will fall to the more diligent. To the appearance of other
remedies designed to secure equal distribution through admin-
istration, the course of this discussion will be forthwith
directed.
It has appeared that in the instance of the creditors' bill
against a decedent's estate, equity extended its remedies to
legatees who were encumbered with similar difficulties at law
to those of the creditor. As no legatee would be entitled to a
distribution until all the debts of the estate had been paid;
and since the legatees were all entitled to be paid ratably, the
remedy which ensued upon the bringing of a legatee's admin-
istration bill was not only the account, and payment of th-
plaintiff if the account so justified, but also a complete execu-
tion of the account. The items of the account were not merely
records of prior claims, but records of prior payments. Not
so in the case of a creditor's bill. As the creditor's right was
not subject to prior claim, and since equity was as indicated
87. Glenn, Creditors' Rights, citing:
Hadden v. Spader, 20 Johns. 554;
Edmonson v. Meacham, 50 Miss. 34;
Gowing v. Rich, 1 Ired. 553.
88. 2 Atk. 600.
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above not replacing, but supplementing the common law
system of priorities, a bill by a creditor to recover his own
debt never involved the payment of any other debts.8 Even
where there were debts of higher nature than the plaintiff's,
their existence was taken into consideration in adjudging
whether the plaintiff was entitled to payment, but they were
not paid prior to his,90 as Professor Langdell puts it, equity
in that respect following the analogy of the law. With the
further growth of administration bills brought by legatees,
we are not at present interested. The growth of the adminis-
tration bills in favor of creditors is the thing which is likely
to be very fruitful to our inquiry. It will hardly be necessary,
though, to pay a great deal of attention to the special cases
of judgment and specialty creditors.
It will be recalled from the discussion in earlier portions
of this paper that simple creditors' bills against executors
weire of exceedingly early origin; and that the legatee's
administration bill was first recognized in 1640. The cred-
itor's administration bill was simply the lineal descendant of
that type of simple creditor's bill, which was brought by one
or all for the benefit of all. That this type of bill should meet
favor in equity is beyond all doubt, because it enabled equity
to make an equal distribution of the debtor's property. By
suing for the benefit of all the creditors, the plaintiff sub..
mitted to the equal treatment of the subsequently appearing
creditors; or by joining in the action by a number of creditors,
the plaintiff submitted to equal justice with them. Such equal
justice is the very thing that equity had been dispensing in
the case of trusts created by a testator for the payment of his
debts where the fund was insufficient. As an illustration of
this, see Povye's Case (1680).9 How zealously equity seized
upon opportunity to apply the doctrine of equality of distri-
bution, and how vigorously it applied it, may be seen in the
89. Langdell, Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdictiop, p. 168.
90, Anonymous 3 Atk. 572.
91. 2 Freeman 51.
182
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doctrine of equitable assets, which it first applied to testa-
mentary trusts as in the case of Feverstone v. Scetle (1697) ;12
and then to administrations upon suit of creditors, as to
which the leading case is that of the Creditors of Sir Charles
Cox (1734). 93 Under this doctrine the legal assets of the
testator were applied to the payment of debts according to
the Common Law priorities, that is, accordingly as the debts
were judgment debts, specialty debts, or simple contract
debts; whereas, the equitable assets were applied to all debts
pro rata in such a fashion that if the prior creditors had
received priorities in the legal assets, their realization from
the equitable assets was postponed until the simple contract
creditors have received an equal proportion of their respective
debts. This meant that in equity all creditors with claims
existing at the time of the debtor's death were to be regarded
as equal, unless after his death they acquired a judgment
prior to the administration suit being brought, in which in-
stance the priority gained by the judgment lien would have
to be respected. As to the ascendency of the administration
bill as a preventative of such prior liens, there will be occasion
directly to speak.
Genetically, then, there is nothing new in the subject of
our present discussion, so far as the invocation of equity's
jurisdiction to act in the premises is concerned; but generic-
ally, the administration bill, involving as it does the principle
of equal distribution of assets, is something quite different
from its progenitor. When we have examined, first, the pro-
tection which equity threw about such a bill, once it had taken
jurisdiction over it, and secondly the inducements, which
equity created for the bringing of the creditor's administra-
tion bill, rather than the creditor's individual bill, we shall
see the former assuming such a supremacy as makes admin-
92. 3 Salkeld 83;
See also, Sheppard v. Kent, 2 Vern. 435.
93. Creditors of Sir Charles Cox, $ P. W. 341;
In re Poole, 6 Ch. Div. 739.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
tration upon a basis of equality one of the fundamaental
doctrines of equity.
First, as to the protection which equity threw about
creditors' administration bills. Plainly, the end which the
administration bill had in view was to require all creditors
to present their claims to the Master in Chancery in the court
in which the bill was then pending, and, after the liquidation
of assets by the executor, to have such assets applied pro rata
(with the exceptions growing out of the different applications
of legal and equitable assets) to the satisfaction of the debts.
To the accomplishment of this purpose the great barrier was
the jurisdiction at law to give judgment upon claims as pre-
sented by individual creditors in individual actions. Pro-
fessor Langdell described the difficulty as follows :0
"But it was still possible for one creditor to gain priority
over others by obtaining a judgment at law against the exec-
utor; and unless some means could be found of preventing
that, no creditor would find it worth his while to file a bill
in equity on behalf of himself and the other creditors for the
administration of the estate, and every insolvent estate of a
deceased debtor would be exhausted in a ruinous struggle
among the creditors for priority, or at best every executor
whose testator's estate was insolvent would be forced to give
a preference to those creditors whom he most favored by
either paying them in full or by confessing judgments in their
favor. "
That the problem is most poignant in the instances of
insolvency goes without saying. The solution was attained
by a series of decisions consisting of Douglas v. Clay
(1767)11 Brooks v. Reynolds (1782) 96 and Kenyon v. Worth-
94. Langdell, Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, pp. 172-73.
In the sentences immediately following, the conceptions are largely
drawn from Professor Langdell's Essays.
95. Dickens 393.
These injunctions against obtaining priorities by actions at law seem
to have been employed earlier in the case of testamentary trusts. See,
Sheppard v. Kent (1702), 2 Vern. 435.
96. 1 Brown's C. C. 183.
184
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ington (1786), in which injunctions were granted against
creditors prosecuting their claims in actions at law. The
ground for such a decree was that as to all of the assets of
the estate, the executor had by the decree for administration,
been made accountable to the court of equity; and equity
would not permit another court to affect that accountability.
Said the Court in Kenyon v. Worthington:
"Having decreed an account of what is due to all cred-
itors, and having decreed an account of assets, and the ad-
ministration of them in payment, will the Court suffer its
decree to be rendered nugatory by altering the course of
administration? Certainly not. It will surely protect the
executor or administrator in obeying its decrees; the cred-
itors will have justice here."
By a subsequent development, the practice grew up of
granting an injunction upon a motion filed in the adminis-
tration suit by the executor or by the plaintiff.98 The former
type of motion, that of the executor, was regarded by Pro-
fessor Langdell as a procedural anomaly, the granting of
relief without suit; the latter type of motion, at the in-
stance of the plaintiff creditor, was regarded as a violation
of the rights of the party suing at law, since relief was
granted against him without a suit to a party who could not
have obtained it by a suit. Probably the Court in reaching
this result, had in its mind the consummation to be wrought
from an administration bill, the bringing of all the creditors
before the court; and, with the consummation in its mind,
assumed a jurisdiction to hear the motions of the creditors
inter se. It follows, a fortiori, from the fact that equity
enjoined actions at law by individual creditors which were
pending at the time of a decree for administration, that it
dissolved suits in equity by individual creditors. However,
under the doctrine of Marriage v. Skiggs (1859), 99 and
97. Dickens, 668.
98. Langdell, Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, p. 177 and cases cited.
99. 4 De G. & J. 4.
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Fowler v. Roberts (1860),100 a creditor who had obtained
judgment at law against the executor before a decree for
administration had been issued, might proceed by way of
execution or garnishment, thus preserving priorities already
attached.
Secondly, we come to the matter of the inducements which
equity created for the bringing of a creditor's administra-
tion bill rather than a creditor's equitable execution bill.
It will readily appear that if an estate is insolvent there is
a strong inducement for each creditor to get what he can,
and since an early judgment at law will give him a priority
in the satisfaction of his claim over the other creditors,
which will under Marriage v. Skiggs be unaffected by a
subsequent decree for administration, he will naturally pro-
ceed at law or in equity by way of equitable execution.
People never walk to the exits in a fire, with the result that
some are crushed. No less can we expect creditors to walk
arm in arm to court, and declare that they wish to share
equally in the assets; they rush with the result again that
some are left by the wayside. If then this system of admin-
istration bills were to effect practical equality, it was neces-
sary to devise a system whereby administration bills could
be made to antecede the individual's bills. This was effected
by way of the direct encouragement by equity of collusive
administration bills, whereby an executor co-operated with
a creditor in his becoming plaintiff in an administration
suit, or the executor sued himself in the name of a creditor.
In the case of Gilpin v. Lady Southampton (1812),101 Lord
Eldon said:
"Ever since I have known this Court suits have been al-
lowed against executors, in truth by executors, in the name of
a creditor against themselves; and this was allowed upon a
100. 2 Giffard 226.
101. Paxton v. Douglas, 8 Ves. Jun. 520;
18 Ves. Jun. 469.
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principle of this sort; that as executors have vast powers of
preference at law; the Court has not disapproved of their com-
ing in the shape of an application by a creditor to give a judg-
ment to all the creditors, and to secure a distribution of the
assets without preference to any."
It would not have been seemly for Lord Eldon to have
said the principle was of the sort to prevent law courts from
getting jurisdiction, but it has not escaped him to mention
that equality was the meritorious result achieved. Collusive
suits were, however, carefully examined for fraud, and dis-
allowed if it appeared that the chief purpose in bringing
them was to hinder and delay creditors. The case of Powell
v. Wallworth (1817)102 is interesting. Here an injunction
against a creditor's action at law was dissolved because it
appeared that the administration suit on account of which
it was issued appeared to be a mere pretext to hinder, delay,
and defraud creditors.
The common law and equity had started out with systems
of creditors' remedies based upon individual creditors'
actions or suits for individual judgments or decrees, followed
by individual executions. Yet equity had by the beginning
of the Nineteenth Century reached-in the case of deceased
debtors at least-a system of administrative remedies, and-
shall we say?1-universal execution. In the result this was
very much like the Roman venditio bonorum. In the process
of the making, it was entirely different. The remedial organ
of the English law was a superstratum. While its substance
permeated deeply the strata below, the character of those
under-strata-the individuality and identity of them-was
not easily to be wiped out. Hence it was that equity accom-
plished by indirection what the Roman Law came to directly.
Equity was only strong where the Common Law was weak.
Its guiding principle was the inadequacy of remedy at law.
102. Paxton v. Roberts, 8 Vesey Jun. 520;
Powell v. Wallworth, 2 Madd. 183.
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Hence it is that piecemeal it reached the result of universal
execution which the Roman Law seems to have grasped in
its entirety.
V.
What then is the American receivership doctrine? As a
form of creditors' remedy, it reached the maturity of its
development in the case of Re Metropolitan Receiver-
ship,103 which was decided in the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1908. At that point of its development we
see the doctrine freed of earlier dogmas, of which we have
had occasion to speak; and at that point it is most amenable
to the analysis of its elements.
The Metropolitan Railway Receivership Case involved
a great mass of litigation arising out of the insolvency of
the New York City Railway Company. A bill was filed in
the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of
New York by the Pennsylvania Steel Car Company, and the
Degnon Contracting Company, Simple creditors of the New
York City Railway Company, for a receiver to be appointed
over the latter Company. The bill alleged diversity of
citizenship as a ground for Federal jurisdiction, and insolv-
ency as a ground for a receivership. It set up the inadequacy
of the remedy at law to creditors in general by reason of the
inability of the Company to continue to pay the interest
charges on its funded debt-a thing which might lead to
foreclosures and dismemberments of the property,-and the
inability of the Company to meet its floating indebtedness,-
a thing which might mean the exhaustion of the Company's
assets through judgments and executions. The prayer was
that the Court take the road into its possession and appoint
a receiver to administer the fund, pending the ascertainment
of the priorities, liens, and equities of the various creditors;
103. 208 U. S. 90.
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that the receiver should be given power to collect the assets
of the Company, operate its railways, and receive the income
thereof, to be applied in accordance with the prior rights
of the parties as the Court might direct, but otherwise in
equal shares to all the creditors; that an injunction should
issue against the defendant and all persons claiming to act
by, through, or under it, and all other persons, restraining
them from interfering with the receiver's possession of the
property.
The Metropolitan Railway Company was the owner of
a number of street railway lines in New York City which
it had leased to the New "York City Railway for a period of
999 years, under a lease providing that the rental was partly
to consist of the payment by the New York City Railway of
the interest charges on the funded debt of the Metropolitan
Company. Subsequently to the appointment of a receiver
over the New York Company, the Metropolitan Company
filed its bill, asking that the receivership be made to extend
over the Metropolitan Company, on the ground that the
solvency of the petitioning company was so dependent upon
the solvency of the lessee company that an ascertainment of
the rights of all the parties depended upon the extension of
the receivership over the petitioner.
While these bills were pending, certain claimants
against the New York Company and others against the
Metropolitan Company, who had actions pending for the re-
covery of their individual claims, filed motions, respectively,
to have the bill for a receiver in the New York City Railway
Case dismissed, and the bill for extension of the receivership
dismissed on the grounds:
(1) That the plaintiffs in the original bill were simple
creditors, and, not having exhausted their legal remedies,
were not entitled to relief in equity.
(2) That the whole litigation was collusive, and did not
involve a controversy within the meaning of the Judicial
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Code. The motion was denied, and a receiver appointed over
the properties of both companies.
The case went up to the Supreme Court on an applica-
tion by the unsuccessful petitioners for a writ of prohibition
to the Judge of Circuit to prevent him from retaining juris-
diction of the cause on the grounds set forth above. The
parties to the cause were joined as defendants.
The Court, in denying the writ, said that the objection
that plaintiffs were not judgment creditors constituted a
defense which the defendant might waive if he wished, citing
the case of Brown v. Lake Superior Iron Company,104 and
maintained, as to the second objection, that the mere fact
that the parties plaintiff and defendant arranged the suit
together and were in friendly accord in its prosecution did
not constitute collusion, when the plaintiff's claims actually
existed.
Barring, for the moment only, the question of inade-
quacy of the remedy at law arising out of the insolvency of
the debtor, and assuming, again only for the moment, such
inadequacy, it is difficult to find a single element in the
Metropolitan Railway Case and similar receivership cases,
which was not a part of classical equity practice. Analyzing
the case we find these elements:
(1) A court of equity aiding a judgment creditor, or
one who for the purpose of the suit was such, (2) by appoint-
ing a receiver, (3) to administer the estate of the debtor for
the benefit of all having claims against it, (4) and by pro-
tecting the receiver in the possession of the property by an
injunction issuing in the receivership suit itself against all
persons who might interfere with such possession; (5) the
remedy not being affected by the fact that the parties plain-
tiff and defendant had amicably arranged the suit.
104. 134 U. S. 530.
Doctrine was applied more recently in Yaryan Naval Stores Com-
pany v. Borchardt Company, 217 Fed. 758.
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(1) "A court of equity aiding a judgment creditor."
We have seen that courts of equity had in the Seventeenth
and Eighteenth Centuries very zealously created rights in
favor of creditors, when the legal remedy against the debtor
was inadequate. Of their own accord they developed the
creditor's bill against the executor of a deceased debtor, and
the creditor's bill against a living debtor to enable the cred-
itor to reach assets not available at law. Under the Statute
of 13 Elizabeth the courts of equity developed a more per-
fect remedy, than the law courts afforded, to give effect to
the Statute by enabling the creditor to reach property
fraudulently conveyed by the debtor. There was this differ-
ence between the bill directed against the executor of a de-
ceased debtor, and that directed against the living debtor,
viz., that the former could be brought by a simple creditor,
the latter only by a judgment creditor. We have attempted
to explain this by saying that the requirement of judgment
in the latter case was a requirement of exhaustion of reme-
dies at law, at which point the inadequacy of the legal
remedy would be first made to appear; whereas the absence
of the requirement in the former case was a recognition by
the courts of creditor's inability to get any remedy at all at
law. Out of the creditor's bill against a decedent debtor's
estate, we have observed, largely following Professor Lang-
dell, that the creditor's administration bill arose-this be-
ing like its progenitor available to the simple creditor. Did
the creditor's administration bill against insolvent corpora-
tions arise out of the creditor's bill against a living debtor
to reach equitable assets? The fact that both are available
to judgment creditors only gives some ground for saying
that they are akin in purpose. This doctrine, in the case
of receivership bills, was firmly established by the case of
Hollins v. Brierfield Coal Company,10 5 in which the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the U. S.
105. 150 U. S. 371.
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District Court which refused to appoint a receiver at the
suit of a simple creditor, on the ground that the plaintiff had
not exhausted his remedies at law. True, the same Court, in
Brown v. Lake Superior Iron Company, and in Re Metro-
politan Railway Receivership, held that a simple creditor
might have a receiver appointed, if the defendant waived the
defense that plaintiff had not exhausted his remedies at law.
But it seems to have been the predominant American rule,
and certainly the United States rule,10 as to all kinds of
creditors' bills, that the existence of a remedy at law consti-
tuted a defense which must have been made in limine; and
hence the doctrine of the Brown case does not militate
against the kinship of the equitable execution bill and the
receivership bill. The Brown Case, it might be said, was
commented upon and distinguished by the Court in the
Hollins Case. It is probably the broad fact that the equit-
able execution bill and the receivership are remedies worked
out in favor of creditors who have exhausted their remedies
at law to enable them through equity to obtain satisfaction
on their debts, that caused at least two courts 10 7 to say that
corporate receivership is a form of equitable execution.
(2) "By appointing a receiver." We have noticed
that the receiver was an arm of the equity court at the very
fountainhead of equity jurisprudence. We have noticed
that the receiver was frequently employed in equitable exe-
cution suits. Finally we noticed his adaptability to situa-
tions, sometimes arising in equitable execution suits, where
106. Wylie, Administrator v. Coxe, 15 How. 415;
Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U. S. 354, 395;
Underhill v. Van Cortlandt, 2 Johns Ch. 339, 369;
Livingston v. Livingston, 4 Johns Ch. 287;
Sherry v. Smith, 72 Wis. 339;
Becker v. -Y ickel, 80 Wis. 484:
Pierstoff v. Jorges, 86 Wis. 128, 136;
But see, Humphrey's v. Atlantic Milling Company, 98 Mo. 542.
107. Vila v. Grand Island Electric Light Co., 68 Neb. 222;
Davis v. Gray, 16 Wallace, 203, 217.
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there were priorities to be taken account of, and conflicting
claims to be adjusted. At the time, then, that the adminis-
tration bill against a decedent debtor's executor was being
developed, equity was able to call upon an officer, similar in
his functions to the executor, to administer an estate. Abor-
iginally an indifferent person created to manage property of
the litigant parties when it seemed improper to the court
that the parties should be suffered to remain in possession,
the receiver had become an appropriate party to be the re-
pository of an estate sought by creditors to be subjected
to the satisfaction of their debts. And later, as our open
eyes will tell us, he did become such repository in that com-
posite creditor's suit against an insolvent corporation,
known as the receivership suit.
(3) "To administer the estate of the debtor for the
benefit of all having claims against it." Administration for
the purpose of securing equal or ratable distribution of a
debtor's property among his creditors is the one innovation
of the receivership suit, and yet this is older than the
Caesars. In the Roman Law the principle involved ap-
peared in the venditio bonorum, the first mode of realiza-
tion by the creditor from his debtor's property. In the English
law it appeared in the Bankruptcy Acts. The progress of
the equity courts towards the principle of equal distribution
was always in the face of pre-existing remedies at law. But
where there was a plain inadequacy of remedy at law, as
appeared in the case of decedents' estates, we have seen that
equity has not failed of that consummation. If an equal in-
adequacy of remedy at law appear in another realm of legal
necessity, let us say in the case of insolvent corporations-
and here we are assuming for the moment only that inade-
quacy of remedy at law-will equity fail to apply the same
course of development? The question does not seem diffi-
cult to the writer. Equity has done so. That equity de-
veloped the receivership out of the equitable execution in the
Washington University Open Scholarship
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same manner as it developed the administration bill out of
the simple creditor's bill, will be disclosed by an examination
of the modus operandi of a receivership suit.
(4) "And by protecting the receiver in the possession
of the property by an injunction issuing in the receivership
suit itself against all persons who might interfere with such
possession." This is precisely the mode in which equity
made its jurisdiction effective in the administration suits.
Under the doctrine that equity would not permit a person
accountable to itself for a fund to be directed by a court of
law in respect to the fund, it made the receivership suit
supreme-it caused all creditors to prove their claims and
share equally out of the receivership, and permitted none to
gain a priority at law. This injunction it will be noted was
issued in the receivership suit itself, and the same manner
as the injunction was issued in the administration suit itself
-the court apparently assuming that all the parties were
before the court, as in the consummation they might be ex-
pected to be.
(5) "The remedy not being affected by the fact that
the parties plaintiff and defendant had amicably arranged
the suit." This smacks very much of the practice in the
administration suits of a friendly creditor cooperating with
the executor in bringing the suit, or having the executor
bring the suit in the creditor's name. The significance of
these respective developments is that thereby that suit
which secured an equality of distributions was facilitated in
preference to those suits which effected individual priorities.
Although the Court in the Metropolitan Railway Case speaks
of the amicable arrangement as not being collusive, it seems
that collusion actually does exist in the effort to prevent
other creditors from gaining a priority in a manner which
is both legal and equitable; and that it is better to denominate
the arrangement as justifiable or "legalized" collusion. Mr.
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Byrne in an essay entitled "The Foreclosure of Railroad Mort-
gages," 108 in observing that the most frequent mode of fore-
closing railroad mortgages had as its first step the bringing
of a friendly judgment creditor's bill for a receiver, gave
as one of the reasons for this procedure the immediate
stoppage of individual suits for judgment and execution.
This practice, which Mr. Byrne speaks of as orthodox, well
illustrates the double-barrel effect of collusive prosecution
and injunction, whereby equity at first brought in the con-
troversy to its own jurisdiction, and then prevented the law
courts from interfering with that jurisdiction. The doctrine
of collusive prosecution of receivership suits was carried to
the vanishing point in the case of the Wabash Railway
Receivership of 1884, when the United States Circuit Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri appointed a receiver to
take over the Railway Company at the Company's own
petition, and upon its own allegations of insolvency.109 The
receivership came into the purview of the Supreme Court in
the case of the Quincy Railroad Company v. Humphries,110
which involved an appeal from an unsuccessful motion of the
Quincy Railroad Company in the receivership case to estab-
lish a priority for rentals under its 999 year lease to the
Wabash as against the holders of the first general mortgage
of the Wabash system. The attack was not directed against
the original jurisdiction of the inferior court, but the
Supreme Court assumed that jurisdiction had validly at-
tached, without justifying that assumption. In view of the
fact that the Wabash Case anteceded the Metropolitan Case,
it is not surprising that the jurisdiction in the former case
should have been regarded as not only anomalous, but
incorrect,' and that another rule should have been followed
108. Stetson, Byrne, Etc., Some Legal Phases of Corporate Financing, Re-
organization, and Regulations, p. 79.
109. Wabash Railway Co. v. Central Trust Co., 22 Fed. 272.
110. 145 U. S. 82.
111. State ex rel. Merriam v. Ross, 122 Mo. 435.
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by almost every State court, 112 except that of Pennsyl-
vania, 113 in which the question has arisen. Nevertheless,
even though we recognize the origin of the receivership in
the equitable cognizance of creditors' rights, it does not
seem that there should be a great objection to permitting the
corporation itself from voluntarily placing itself in the hands
of its creditors, after the Metropolitan Case had established
that it could do so by having a dummy creditor bring the
suit. Certainly such a result would not be a mcre radical
departure from the creditor's receivership suit, than the
legatee's administration suit was from the creditor's admin-
istration suit. Certainly it is consonant with the spirit of
modern procedure to suffer the style of the case to accord
with its actuality. If the corporation can turn itself over
to a receiver by "legalized" collusion, why not b' direct
petition?
VI.
A single question remains to be answered: What inade-
quacy of legal remedies prompted the assumption of juris-
diction in equity to administer insolvent estates? Our
discussion is not here to be confined to the inadequacy of
the remedies which the common law afforded. This inade-
quacy we have demonstrated in an early portion of this
paper, when we described the only legal processes for the
satisfaction of creditors as judgment and execution, and
limited the inadequacy of the legal system to cases of
insolvency where successive executions exhausted the
debtor's estate in favor of the more diligent creditors, before
subsequently petitioning creditors received any satisfaction
112. State ex rel. Merriam v. Ross, 122 Mo. 435;
Kimball v. Goodburn, 32 Mich. 11;
Jones v. Bank of Leadville, 10 Colo. 464;
McIlhenny v. Binz, 80 Tex. 1, 7;
In re Moss Cigar Co., Limited, 50 La. Ann. 789;
Jones v. Schaff Brothers Co., 187 Mo. App. 597.
113. Petition of Kittanning Is. Co., 146 Pa. St. 102.
• 196
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol9/iss3/2
JIURISDICTION OF COURTS OF EQUITY IN INSOLVENTS' ESTATES 197
at all. But our discussion must be extended to include a
comparison of the bankruptcy acts with the equitable juris-
diction here under examination.
Beginning in the year 1544 and extending uninterrupt-
edly to the present day in England, this legislation afforded
an effective means of causing an insolvent debtor's estate
to be subjected to the payment pro rata of his creditors'
claims, so that there never was a time except when equity
was in its rather unpromising infancy, when it could have
been said that it had jurisdietion to administer insolvent
estates of individual debtors for want of remedy at law.
In a like manner, bankruptcy legislation, despite the fact
that federal bankruptcy acts have existed during only forty-
two years of our national life, has dominated the American
jurisprudence of insolvent debtors' estates, both through the
constituaonal recognition of the field as one to be governed
by legislative policy,114 and through the existence of State
insolvency acts.
Assuming that we have the case of an individual debtor,
it can be fairly said that a creditor in invoking the aid of
equity to secure administration of his debtor's estate would
be met with the defense, full, adequate and complete remedy
at law. The creditor would be asking nothing which it was
not already the function of the bankruptcy acts to afford.
But suppose the debtor were a corporation! It is
entirely conceivable, in view of new problems which might
arise in the case of corporations, that a court of equity might
view the bankruptcy procedure, though applicable to corpor-
ations, as incapable of affording so complete and adequate a
remedy as equity itself was able to afford. It is entirely
possible that we shall find that the equitable remedy of
administration was confined to corporations only, because
only in the instance of corporations was equity not blocked,
114. Federal Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8.
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in the exercise of a function which it held ready to exercise,
by the defense, full, adequate and complete remedy at law.
That the conception here set forth is a true conception
seems to be suggested by two outstanding facts in the contem-
poraneous history of this subject: (1) That the adminis-
tration of insolvents' estates in equity is a distinctly Amer-
ican phenomenon; (2) that there exist in England as part
of the English Companies' Act very full provisions for the
liquidation of insolvent corporations. 11 5  No special cor-
porate liquidation statutes exist in the United States, and
no corporate receivership doctrine exists in England in
behalf of the judgment creditors of an insolvent corporation.
It is true that the British courts of chancery have under-
taken to administer insolvent corporations. But in all such
cases it will be made to appear that the administration was
undertaken in behalf of proprietary interests, and not in the
perfection of creditors' remedies.
Thus, in Ames v. The Trustees of Birkenhead Docks,1'0
a typical case, suit was brought by a mortgagee of the tolls
of an insolvent dock company to enjoin judgment creditors
from attaching the tolls, and to have a receiver appointed
to collect the tolls and to apply them, after the payment of
operating expenses, to the satisfaction of plaintiff's mortgage
debt. The Court held that the injunction had properly
issued, and the receiver had properly been appointed. To
the objection of a judgment creditor that the receiver of a
mortgagee had no franchise, or would have no franchise, to
operate the docks, the Court made the following statement,
115. A very full discussion of the Companies' Act of 1908 is found in
Lord Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 5. Earlier Companies' acts
are 7-8 Vict. C. 110 (1844), 19-20 Vict. C. 47 (1856), and 25-26 Vict.
C. 89 (1862).
116. 20 Beav. 332. See also,
Potts v. Warwick and Birmingham Canal Co., Kay 142;
De Winton v. Mayor of Brecon, 26 Beav. 533;
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definitive of the nature of the right which its receiver was
to be appointed to protect:
"If no such power of taking possession existed the
mortgage would be a worthless security, and the mortgagee
would be at the mercy of the mortgagor, who, in that case,
might say to him, if you enforce your mortgage, you destroy
the property mortgaged." ,
It is a considerable step, however, from the enforcement
of a property right to the enforcement of a creditor's claim.
This step the English Court of Chancery refused to take. In
Gardiner v. Railway Company,"T it declined to administer
by its receiver upon the assets of an insolvent corporation
in the interest of an unsecured creditor. It is doubtful if the
court could have done otherwise than to have declined the
jurisdiction in the face of a corporate liquidation statute
which purported to deal comprehensively with the disposi-
tion of the assets of insolvent corporations.
Recurring now to the situation confronting an American
court of equity, when asked to administer by its receiver an
insolvent corporation, it becomes clear that the court is not
hampered in its jurisdiction by any statutory development
other than the bankruptcy legislation. This legislation
originated before corporation problems had assumed any
significance. Although it had subsequently been made
applicable to corporations, it can fairly be said that the
legislation was originally conceived without reference to
them. Whether such a remedy was a full, complete and
adequate remedy at law, so as to be an efficient bar to equity
jurisdiction, is the crux of this inquiry.
In approaching the question of adequacy of remedy we
are not applying a legal yard-stick, but we are expressing
a ratio of legal remedy to factual circumstances. In the
denominator of that ratio we must consider the economic
circumstances of the corporation, which, if potent enough,
117. L. R. 2 Ch. App. 202.
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may conceivably cause the same legal remedy, bankruptcy,
adequate enough as to individuals, now to express a frac-
tional ratio of adequacy. We believe this to be not only
conceivable but true. As a result of industrial revolution.
by and large, individuals have limited numbers of assets and
very simple balance sheets. By and large, corporations have
a maze of assets and liabilities, controllable often only by
armies of accountants. The provisions of the Bankruptcy
Acts for the institution of suits by a specified number of
creditors representing specified amounts, 118 the individual
allowances of claims,119 the meetings of creditors, 20 their
appointment of a trustee,121 all savor of an economic plane
to which corporations do not as a group belong. But this
goes to the unsuitableness of the legislative remedy, not to
its inadequacy. And there lies not our chief grievance. The
economic integration of industry, which has gone on hand
in hand with the development of the corporation as its form
of organization, has been characterized by two new phe-
nomena having bearing on our subject. In the first place,
by a corresponding integration of property rights in the
assets of the corporation, represented by various classes of
securities. The Bankruptcy Act has not provided a means
of adjusting the priorities of secured creditors in the same
suit with the general creditors. It is therefore inadequate.
In the second place, the economic integration of industry is
characterized by an increased importance of aggregate
values. By that we mean that the value of the assets of a
corporation tend to approximate a capitalization of earning
power, rather than to equal the sum of the values of the
individual properties. This is so because the individual
properties function as a part of the whole integrated system.
118. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Sec. 59b.
119. Ibid., Sec. 55b.
120. Ibid., Sec. 55a, e.
121. Ibid., Sec. 44.
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The Bankruptcy Act in providing for the sale of the prop-
erties rather than the continuance of their use in the inte-
grated whole is destroying values which may be the only
values remaining to the simple creditors after consideration
of security holders. This condition is well illustrated by the
Wabash Railway Receivership. The Wabash System was
composed of a great many rail properties owned subject to
divisional mortgages, or leased subject to stipulations for the
payment of interest on the mortgages on the property. A
default of interest would have been followed by separate
foreclosures, and the eventual disintegration of the system,
rendering the equities available to simple creditors unavail-
able. The inability to accomplish consistence under the
Bankruptcy Act made its remedies clearly inadequate.
Finally, in the case of public service corporations, public
interest demands continued operation, and forbids disin-
tegration.
Viewing the receivership doctrine as the product of an
evolution of creditors' remedies in equity-an evolution
having as its impulse the inadequacy of remedy at law, which
knew only individual judgments and executions, and which
failed of equal justice when the judgments and executions
exhausted the debtor's estate-we are driven to the conclu-
sion that the justification for its confinement to corporations
does not lie in the legal differences between a natural person
and a corporation, and the character of the assets of the
latter as trust funds, but in the economic differences as
affecting the adequacy of the remedy at law, provided by
the bankruptcy acts.
To say that equity would have developed a receivership
system applicable to individuals and corporations during the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries in England, if no
Bankruptcy Acts had intervened, is mere speculation. To
say that it would have developed such in the case of corpor-
ations during the Nineteenth Century, when corporations
were becoming important, if no Companies Acts had inter-
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vened, is likewise speculation. All that may be said is,
equity had the equipment, and had used similar equipment
under similar circumstances in the case of decedents' estates.
And although the American doctrine is by no means uni-
form,122 the existence of jurisdiction in the United States
courts needs no testimonial, but the testimonial of fact.
122. In many states, the jurisdiction to administer insolvent corporations was
exercised in only a limited form. In others, the creation of the remedy
was the work of the legislatures. Decisions and statutes governing
the doctrine in the several states are gathered in 4 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisdiction, IV Ed.. Sec. 127, note 310.
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